In alt.fan.frank.mccoy "D Flint" <david@qssp.com> wrote:
>What do you think about this and have you seen this popular site before?
>
>This was taken from a web site
>http://www.afvr.org
>
>How can we safeguard the integrity of each vote?
>Today we have technology that protects our financial systems, military
>weapon systems and national intelligent organizations. These proven systems
>can be combined in a way to issue serialized equipment to authorize
>personnel for the dates and hours needed. Each would have their own level of
>clearance to perform the tasks they are responsible for. Each action would
>be recorded and verified with a higher levels of network authority and
>again, only available during the hours and dates needed. Ballots would only
>be printed after the voter has cast their vote but before they leave the
>booth. If the voter made a mistake he could put the printed ballot into the
>booth's scanner for correction. All ballots scanned at the booth would go
>into a shredder and the voter could then correct his ballot on the screen
>and reprint his ballots. Once the voter accepts the printed ballot he
>submits his vote on the screen and takes the two ballots to the depository.
>So two computer generated, serialized and scanner perfect receipts of the
>completed ballot are printed.* One for the voter and one for the public
>record. This would eliminate all the extra ballots that could be used for
>unauthorized voting as well as any question of voter intent. Each piece of
>equipment involved in the issuing of the receipt would be linked to the
>serial# of that ballot and an electronic document would be generated that
>exactly matched the two printed receipts. So the voter themselves has
>validate the printed ballots, keeping one for themselves, while the other
>electronic time-stamped document is deposited into an optical scanner used
>as a secure depository. This second scanned count which should always match
>the electronic count. This paper ballot could also be used for recounts if
>needed. The voter could use the receipt to inquire about their vote in the
>future. The stuffing of the ballot box or "finding ballots" would be
>eliminated. With this system, if you find a ballot, you have to find the
>voter that cast that ballot too. This is not so in any of the current
>systems in place today nor have we ever heard such a system ever proposed.
> http://www.afvr.org
>
The problems with this suggested system is that it leads to the
possibility of both vote-buying and enforced voting. If the voter
receives a copy of his/her votes, then he/she can sell his/her vote to
somebody and use the ballot as proof he/she did so. Alternatively, a
strong-man/bully/political-enforcer can tell people they MUST vote for
XXX, and if people don't, they get shot or otherwise abused (like lose
their jobs). The point is: We need a *secret* ballot, not a Public
one like you propose.
There *are* valid secret-ballot systems that provide paper-trails and
verification by the voter, that don't have the problems with the
system you suggest. Now *I* suggest that you do a little more
homework on the subject; as other people have. A few months ago, I
believe Scientific American had a good discussion of many of the
systems available or suggested, and the problems with each and how to
fix them.
Actually, the system used around here in Minnesota is (to my mind at
least) one of the best: A marked, machine-readable paper ballot,
where the voter fills in spots (not lines) to mark his/her choices.
The ballot is fed into a machine that verifies the ballot (like not
allowing more choices for an office than are allowed) and if it's
invalid, then it spits the ballot back out, and the voter is given a
new one, while the rejected ballot goes into a special pile. Verified
ballots go into a locked box and are counted.
The machine-readability makes for fast and accurate counting, while
the paper makes for verifiability of the machine; as ballots CAN be
counted by-hand and checked against the results the machine gives.
Others, such as the Electronic-Machine types used in Florida and other
places that (presently) don't have a paper-trail, can have such
*added* by the addition of a printer behind a window, where the voter
can verify his selection. If the printed selection doesn't match, the
voter can reject that ballot and enter a corrected one. The valid
printout, when accepted, goes into a locked box and is also
machine-readable; but allows for manual recounts and checks against
electronic tampering in the same way the paper ballots we use are.
The invalidated ballots go into a separate box, and are (eventually)
destroyed.
There are even systems using encryption, where a person *can* vote and
check to make sure his/her vote was registered correctly later on,
while retaining the secrecy needed for a valid vote. These however,
to my mind, get unnecessarily complicated; and still retain some
possibilities for vote-buying or pressure; though the likelihood is
slim. as it requires the *very* active cooperation of the voter being
pressured or bought. Not worth it.
Nice idea; but not thought through enough. Do a little more research.
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